Ethical Issues in Global Supply Chains by Bodo Schlegelmilch & Magdalena Oberseder






Edited by: ISTEI - University of Milan-Bicocca                                                        ISSN: 1593-0319 
Gatti Corrado, Leadership and Cultural Renewal in Corporate Turnarounds, Symphonya. Emerging 
Issues in Management (www.unimib.it/symphonya), n. 2, 2002, pp. 85-96 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4468/2002.2.09gatti 
85 
Leadership and Cultural Renewal  









Turnarounds are corporate changes which take place when a firm undergoes a 
survival-threatening performance decline, whereas restructurings can take place 
also if a firm is not facing a deep crisis, but a slight decline or is simply looking for 
new business opportunities. 
A  turnaround  is  successful  when  the  firm  is  able  to  reverse  the  performance 
crisis, end the threat to its survival and achieve sustained profitability. 
Successful corporate turnarounds depend upon the replacement of the current 
top management and actions to be taken simultaneously at three different levels, 
strategic, financial and organizational. 
Successful turnarounds seem to imply a renewal of the organization’s shared 
basic assumptions, i.e. the firm’s culture. Cultural renewal appears to be crucial, 
as well as complex and uncertain. 
 





1. Introduction  
 
After  a  decade  of  expansion  and  dramatic  productivity  increases,  economic 
growth in western countries has recently slowed down. Key indicators of economic 
development (e.g. corporate growth and profitability, and consumer confidence) 
have declined. Stock markets have reacted negatively, reducing the valuation of 
many listed manufacturing and service companies, in some cases by up to 90% 
during a one-year period (Roland Berger, 2001). In this context, corporate crises, 
and  consequently  corporate  restructurings,  seem  to  be  back  in  fashion.  These 
phenomena appear to be relevant and generalized, since they regard a large number 
of companies, with no sectoral, dimensional or geographical distinguishing marks. 
Thus,  corporate  crisis  and  restructuring  seem  to  have  now  gathered  greater 
attention among both practitioners and academics.  
This  paper  will  focus  on  a  particular  kind  of  corporate  restructurings,  i.e. 
turnarounds. These are corporate changes which take place when a firm undergoes 
a survival-threatening performance decline, whereas restructurings can take place 
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also if a firm is not facing a deep crisis, but a slight decline or is simply looking for 
new business opportunities (Guatri, 1995; Barker III and Duhaime, 1997; Rispoli, 
1998). Therefore, a turnaround is successful when the firm is able to reverse the 
performance crisis, end the threat to its survival and achieve sustained profitability. 
More in particular, it will be argued that successful turnarounds depend upon three 
main issues. The first concerns the fact that a new top management is required to 
perform the actions which are necessary to get the company back on track. The 
second relates to the fact that actions to be taken should regard simultaneously 
strategic,  financial  and  organizational  aspects.  Thus,  creating  a  balanced 
turnaround mix of actions which is able to ensure the firm’s survival. The third 
regards  the  fact  that  corporate  turnarounds  should  be  founded  on  a  process  of 
cultural renewal.  
 
 
2. The Establishment of a New Leadership 
 
When  a  survival-threatening  situation  comes  to  evidence,  and  in  order  to 
overcome it, a new leadership should be established.  
 
□  At  this  regard,  Brenneman,  the  former  chief  executive  officer  at 
Continental Airlines, has recently stated, ‘I have never seen the team 
that managed a company into a crisis get it back on track. Oh, I’m sure 
it has happened some time in the history of business, but I can’t believe 
it  has  happened  very  often.  Instead,  managers  who  have  gotten  a 
company  into  a  mess  are  usually  mired  in  a  puddle  of  overbrained 
solutions. They can’t see any way out either. In fact, they have many 
ways of saying: If the solutions were simple, we would have already 
thought of it’ (Brenneman, 1998).  
 
There are several reasons why in distressed firms the establishment of a new 
leadership represents a fundamental issue in order to perform the turnaround. First, 
the  existing  top  management  usually  fails  in  accepting  responsibility  for  and 
reversing  the  poor  decisions  it  has  made  in  the  past.  ‘It’s  an  ego  thing’,  as 
Brenneman  states  (Brenneman,  1998).  Second,  the  replacement  of  the  top 
management enables a strong and immediate break up with the past and consents to 
communicate to stakeholders, both external (e.g. banks and partners) and internal 
(e.g. middle management and lower levels), the intention of a radical reorientation. 
Finally,  it  should  be  underlined  that  the  employees  generally  do  not  trust  the 
existing top management anymore.  
The systemic approach to the study of the firm also underlines the importance of 
new leaders in particular moments of the system’s development path (Golinelli, 
2000a;  Golinelli,  2000b;  Sterman,  2000).  If  the  structure  which  originates  the 
system needs major changes and the system has to be guided along a radically 
different path, as when it has to overcome a crisis, then its governing body has to 
be  substituted  first.  Furthermore,  the  Resource  Based  View  (RBV)  implicitly 
assumes that radical change in a firm needs leadership to be changed (Prahalad and 
Hamel, 1990). If the resources or competencies on which the firm is based do not 
support its competitiveness, a necessary step is to replace the actors that manage 
the resources or competencies at the top level. In other words, if the firm has to 
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management  has  to  be  different.  Nevertheless,  as  the  distinguished  Professor 
Donaldson points out, in some cases the radical changes implied by a turnaround 
have been effectively managed by the existing management (Donaldson, 1994). 
For example, this is what has happened with General Mills, Burlington Northern 
and CPC International. However, these seem to be extremely rare cases (Hofer, 
1991).  
Establishing  a  new  leadership  generally  implies  that  the  chairman  and/or  the 
chief executive officer (CEO) and/or the chief operating officer (COO) has to be 
replaced. It should be noticed that the decisions concerning the replacement of the 
top  management  (e.g.  when  and  who  should  be  the  new  leaders)  are  taken  by 
different  actors  depending  upon  the  firm’s  property  structure.  In  large  public 
companies, choosing the new leaders is a responsibility of the board of directors. 
This choice, however, is generally the outcome of a mixture of pressures by the 
directors, the banks and the institutional shareholders. In owner-managed firms, of 
course, the decision lies within the responsibility of the owner. However, banks 
may insist to introduce a turnaround manager to work alongside the owner (Slatter 
and Lovett, 1999).  
The establishment of a new leadership often involves substitution of employees 
at a middle management level. In these cases, the new top management, once it has 
settled, decides to perform its task bringing in  the company new actors in key 
positions. This is what has happened in many distressed companies in the U.S.A. 
 
□ In the case of the turnaround of Intergroup of Arizona Inc., for 
example,  a  new  CEO  replaced  the  chief  financial  officer,  the  vice 
president of sales and marketing, the vice president of operations and 
the director of individual products (Gonzales, 2000). 
 
If the outlined process of middle management substitution is extensive, then it 
can be said that the company faces a management reengineering.  
Once the new leadership has been established, it has to integrate effectively with 
the firm’s structure, i.e. people working within the firm at every level. The reason 
for this is that everyone in the structure has to be involved and committed, in order 
to support the change with enthusiasm. It is generally claimed that, in order to 
recover, old habits and procedures should be abandoned and a unity of intents built. 
At  this  regard,  classical  and  enlightening  examples  come  from  Alfred  Sloan’s 
approach at General Motors and Lee Iacocca’s at Chrysler (Sloan, 1963; Iacocca, 
1983).  
The  Human  Resource  (HR)  department  generally  plays  an  important  role  in 
rendering the changes shared by the company at all levels, especially when external 
consultants are involved in or even guide the turnaround process. 
 
□ As Milite, a HR management expert, points out, ‘Top management 
can bring in turnaround professionals, and top management can let the 
rest of the company know it backs the turnaround process. But that may 
not  be  enough  to  calm  the  fears  of  employees  …  That’s  where  HR 
comes in. Because of their unique place in the company, HR people can 
help or hinder turnaround efforts considerably … The HR department 
can set the tone for the turnaround acceptance … Communication and 
cooperation are the most important elements of a successful turnaround 
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between turnaround professionals and the rest of the company’ (Milite, 
1999). 
 
It should be noticed that in Anglo-Saxon countries, where the managerial labour 
market is highly dynamic, distressed firms frequently turn to professionals named 
turnaround specialists (Mackay, 1999; Editorial, 2000; Maurer, 2000). These are 
managers which have considerable leadership skills, flexibility (the ability to listen 
and modify views), the ability and courage to make rapid decisions based on a 
minimum of data and analysis, and a relevant experience at driving through change 
in difficult times. The turnaround specialist is usually appointed as CEO, but may 
not start out in this position.  In fact, turnaround specialists sometimes work as 
consultants  while  assessing  the  firm’s  crisis  situation  and  then  join  the  board. 
Moreover, the turnaround specialist generally brings in the company a  team of 
professionals whom he trusts. 
 
 
3. Turnaround Actions and the Firm’s Equilibria 
 
Once the new top management has entered the company, it has to assess the 
causes  of  the  crisis  and  then  take  action  in  order  to  turnaround  the  firm’s 
performance. Consequently, a plan of action is needed (Weston, Siu and Brian, 
2001). This should carefully evaluate the firm’s strengths and weaknesses, as well 
as environmental opportunities and threats, thus representing a useful guide for 
developing decisions and policies. Once the plan has been set, the firm should stick 
with  it  and  continually  monitor  its  performance  against  it.  However,  plans  are 
subject to revision, both in anticipation and reaction to internal and environmental 
change. The product mix, for example, is continuously reviewed and modified on 
the basis of external changes and new knowledge and understanding. 
In a turnaround situation the top management should plan major changes of three 
different kinds, strategic, financial and organizational. The first concern the scope 
of  the  firm’s  activities,  i.e.  the  firm’s  business  areas  and  the  way  in  which  it 
operates in them. Actions to be taken at this level may include, for example, sell-
offs  or  divestitures  and  acquisitions.  The  second  refer  to  the  firm’s  financial 
structure  and  policies.  Changes  at  this  level  may  include,  for  example, 
recapitalizations and exchange offers. The third concern the reengineering of the 
firm’s organizational structure in a broad sense. This includes, for example, the 
adoption  of  a  functional  structure  in  lieu  of  the  multi-divisional  one  and 
downsizing. 
The  importance  of  taking  action  simultaneously  at  a  strategic,  financial  and 
organizational level may be connected to the circumstance that firms which face 
deep crisis need radical change, which in turn requires the firm to change as a 
whole. In other words, radical change may not be effectively implemented if it fails 
to take into account all of the three faces of a business dynamics, which are the 
strategic,  the  financial  and  the  organizational  one.  Furthermore,  it  should  be 
underlined that a firm’s survival and possible competitive advantage is based on 
the  simultaneous  and  continuous  achievement  of  three  types  of  equilibria, 
economic, financial and organizational (Cafferata, 1995a). Firms which are facing 
a crisis generally need to restore all of the three equilibria and consequently to 
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It has been claimed that turnaround situations differ from normal conditions in 
that  the  former  require  radical  change,  whereas  the  latter  do  not.  In  normal 
situations,  in  fact,  firms  should  be  characterized  by  dynamic  stability 
(Abrahamson, 2000). At its essence, this is a process of continual but relatively 
small  change  efforts  that  involve  the  reconfiguration  of  existing  practices  and 
business  models  rather  than  the  creation  of  new  ones.  Firms,  like  individuals, 
should continuously engage in sequential learning and in small adjustments and 
improvements, which should be implemented at the right intervals. 
In order to perform a successful turnaround the top management should build a 
cautiously balanced turnaround mix of actions of the three kinds. In building the 
aforementioned mix, it should take into account the interactions existing among the 
three kinds of actions. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the mix is to be 
built  both  ex  ante  and  ex  post.  Ex  ante,  to  meet  the  need  of  planning,  with 
consciousness and rationality, the actions which seem to be able to grant the firm’s 
survival. Ex post, to assess the degree of success of the different actions which 
have been implemented. 
After the turnaround mix has been planned, it has to be implemented. It has been 
claimed  that  effective  implementation  depends  not  only  upon  the  new  top 
management’s capabilities, but also upon the efficiency with which the actions are 
carried out. More in particular, it has been argued that effective implementation of 
radical change, such as a turnaround, is influenced by the quality of the firm’s 
resources, processes and values (Christensen and Overdorf, 2000). Resources relate 
to the tangible and intangible endowment which characterizes the firm. Processes 
represent the patterns of interaction, coordination, communication, and decision 
making employees use to transform resources into products and services of greater 
worth.  Finally  values,  which  sometimes  carry  an  ethical  connotation,  are  the 
standards by which employees set priorities that enable them to judge whether an 
order is attractive or unattractive, whether a customer is more important or less 
important, whether an idea for a new product is attractive or marginal, and so on.  
The  relative  importance  of  each  kind  of  action  varies  depending  upon  the 
concrete case, so it can cannot be argued that actions of one kind are always more 
or less important in comparison with actions of another kind (Bowman, Singh, 
Useem  and  Bhadury,  1999).  Regarding  this  issue,  early  corporate  turnaround 
theorists claimed that strategic reorientations are central to the recovery process at 
many declining firms. However, subsequent empirical research has reported that 
successful  turnarounds  are  primarily  connected  to  cutback  actions  that  increase 
efficiency, i.e. mostly financial and organizational actions. It seems that the gap 
between theory and empirical evidence has been recently closed by Barker III and 
Duhaime,  who  discuss  a  model  proposing  that  the  extent  of  strategic  change 
initiated in a successful turnaround, and therefore its contribution to the success of 
the process, varies systematically with a declining firm’s need and capability to 
reorient its strategy (Barker III and Duhaime, 1997).  
Turnaround  processes  generally  take  place  over  a  long  period  of  time 
(Grudzinski, 2000). 
 
□ Consider, for example, Finmeccanica, the biggest Italian company 
operating in the defence and space industries. It took the firm more 
than  three  years  (1997-2000)  to  reverse  its  poor  performance  and 
achieve sustained profitability (Gatti, 2002). During the same period 
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similar  rejuvenating  processes,  in  order  to  create  the  conditions  for 
privatisation  (Cafferata, 1995b). 
 
Nevertheless, in some cases successful turnaround processes seem to conclude 
very quickly  (Nelms, 2000). This is what has  happened, for  example,  to Qatar 
Airways, which recovered in a few months. Turnaround processes, no matter if 
they take a long or a short time, are always very complicated and uncertain, and 
should gain momentum at all times (Brenneman, 1998).  
 
 
4. From a New Ideology to a New Culture: Governing Corporate Fragility 
 
The final aspect on which we would like to draw our attention is represented by 
the fact that successful turnarounds seem to imply a renewal of the firm’s culture. 
In  fact,  the  effectiveness  of  the  new  leadership,  effective  implementation  of 
turnaround  actions  (strategic,  financial  and  organizational),  commitment, 
enthusiasm and unity of intents of human resources all seem to imply a renewal of 
what Schein calls the ‘organization’s shared basic assumptions’, i.e. organizational 
culture (Schein, 1992). These assumptions pertain to the solutions experimented by 
the firm over time for adaptation to the environment and internal integration.  
This aspect should be looked at more closely. In particular, our aim is to discuss 
the link between the establishment of a new leadership and the creation of a new 
culture, as well as to shed light on the essence of the process of cultural renewal. 
Our interpretation is represented in the following figure (Figure 1). 
 



















Although the importance of establishing a new leadership in order to perform the 
turnaround process has been previously discussed, it has to be pointed out that this 
key issue does not lead directly and immediately to a new culture within the firm. 
The  establishment  a  new  leadership  can  be  expected,  instead,  to  imply  the 







Process of cultural renewal: 
- it takes a long time; 
- it is a dialectical process; 
- it implies shifting from a 
coercive to an enabling type of 
culture; 
- it implies progressive fragility  
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of intents relating to the future of the firm. As such, the introduction of a new 
ideology typically regards the short term. 
Cultural renewal can only be expected to start from the new ideology, as it is not 
an event, a discrete choice of the new leader that takes place at a single point in 
time. On the contrary, it is a complex process, which takes a long time to generate 
a new culture. Furthermore, the contents of a new ideology stem from external 
sources (Weick, 1995), whereas the ones of a new culture consist in new collective 
and successful experiences and arrangements which originate within the firm.  
The  process  of  cultural  renewal  takes  place  by  means  of  numerous  and  very 
different actions, such as training, implementation of new managerial approaches 
and operating systems, etc. It goes far beyond the scope of our work to deepen the 
different actions, their connections and impacts. To this regard it is our intention to 
point out four general aspects.  
The first relates to the fact that the process of cultural renewal takes place over a 
long  period  of  time.  Creation  and  absorption  of  new  shared  basic  assumptions 
represent a slow process, one that unfolds over years. Keeping the firm’s people 
involved throughout the process is a crucial factor for the establishment of a new 
culture and it’s a job that lies at the heart of leadership. 
The second aspect to be considered is that cultural renewal should be intended as 
a dialectical process (Benson, 1977). As such, its development is guided by the 
application of four principles: 
-  social construction/production: cultural renewal can be seen as a result of 
continued social interactions both within the firm and between the firm and 
its  environment.  Through  these  interactions  old  social  arrangements  are 
gradually  modified  or  replaced.  The  production  of  new  social  patterns  is 
itself guided and constrained by the new leadership and the external context; 
-  totality: the process has to be guided relationally, that is with attention to the 
multiple inteconnections existing among each part and participant in the firm 
and between the firm and its environment; 
-  contradiction:  every  social  order,  and  thus  every  organization,  contains 
contradictions, ruptures, inconsistencies, and incompatibilities. On one hand, 
these contradictions are to be used as levers for radical breaks with the old 
shared assumptions. On the other, they should be controlled in order not to 
exacerbate conflicts among human resources or in ways which contain it; 
-  praxis: cultural renewal should contribute to the construction of new shared 
assumptions on the basis of reasoned analyses on both the limits and the 
potential of the old social forms. 
 
The  third  aspect  to  be  considered  is  that  the  process  of  cultural  renewal, 
considered as a whole, should consist in shifting from a coercive type of culture to 
an enabling one. Borrowing concepts from prior research on bureaucracy (Alder 
and  Borys,  1996),  the  aforementioned  distinction  can  be  traced  as  follows.  A 
coercive  culture  stifles  creativity,  fosters  dissatisfaction  and  demotivates 
employees, whereas  an  enabling  culture provides needed  guidance  and  clarifies 
responsibilities, easing role stress and helping individuals at every level to be and 
feel more effective. Thus, an enabling culture represents a complement to, rather 
than a substitute for commitment. Among other things, an enabling culture depends 
on  the  characteristics  –  not  the  different  degrees  –  of  the  core  features  of  the 
bureaucratic  form,  i.e.  workflow  formalization,  specialization  and  hierarchy. 
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instructions.  An  enabling  logic  is  founded  on  the  attributes  of  the  type  of 
formalization  which  is  adopted,  not  its  different  degrees.  In  an  enabling  logic, 
formalization  designs  procedures  that  facilitate  responses  to  real  work 
contingencies.  Procedures  are  not  designed  to  highlight  to  superiors  whether 
subordinates’ actions are in compliance and deviation from standard procedures is 
not  seen  as  suspect.  Thus,  formalization  helps  to  signal  to  the  organization 
emerging problems and becomes an opportunity  for learning  and improvement. 
Furthermore, enabling formalization provides human resources with visibility into 
their work. It isn’t formulated as a list of flat assertions of duties. Moreover, the 
enabling approach to formalization provides human resources with a wide range of 
contextual  information,  designed  to  help  them  interact  creatively  within  the 
organization and with its environment. 
The last aspect relates to the fact that the process of cultural renewal should be 
intended  as  a  mechanism  for  governing  the  firm’s  fragility,  both  internal  and 
external.  The  former  concerns  its  internal  functioning,  whereas  the  latter  its 
relationship with the environment. The aforesaid fragility derives from the fact that 
the  firm  is  undergoing  a  deep  crisis.  In  particular,  the  distressed  firm  faces  a 
situation characterized by the fact that the systemic conditions which enable its 
survival and competitiveness are seriously damaged. Stemming from mainstream 
theories of organization, these conditions may be said to include differentiation, 
structuring, integration, goal seeking and equilibrium (Cafferata, 2003). The new 
leaders  should  then  govern  the  process  in  order  to  restore  the  firm’s  systemic 
conditions,  thus  progressively  reducing  its  fragility.  The  process  of  cultural 
renewal then consists in a process for  governing the firm’s fragility, it aims at 
reducing  such  fragility  by  building  a  new,  enabling  culture  which  consents  the 
systemic conditions to be restored. Thus, the new, enabling culture represents a 
fundamental organizational technology, and in turn a powerful weapon for the firm 
in competition. 
Intending the process of cultural renewal as  a  means for  governing corporate 
fragility appears to be central, as it may provide two major benefits. A first benefit 
may come to the new leaders, offering them powerful motives for initiating and 
pursuing thoroughly cultural renewal in the turnaround process. Which in turn may 
strengthen the rational basis for the investment of financial resources in the process 
of cultural renewal. In fact, in order for the new ideology to turn into a new culture, 
it has to be confirmed by successful strategic and operating choices which require 
investments  for  their  implementation.  A  second  benefit  may  come  to  those 
responsible for selecting and developing actions for cultural renewal, in that it may 
clarify the connections between certain actions and the firm’s systemic conditions, 
thus underlining the progressive fragility reduction.  
 
□ As an example of cultural renewal in a turnaround process consider 
the case of Pirelli, an Italian company engaged in the manufacturing of 
tyres, energy cables and systems, and telecom cables and systems. In 
the early 1990s, the CEO, Marco Tronchetti Provera, has based the 
cultural  change  on  value-based  management  and  on  thoroughly 
different  communication  patterns  within  the  firm.  Moreover,  the 
commitment of  each top manager to the firm’s  turnaround plan has 
been  managed  as  a  personal  contract:  Pirelli  managers  had  their 
personal  assignments,  their  budgets  and  had  to  keep  their  word  by 










One last point appears to be important to underline. It is difficult to judge the 
progress of  cultural renewal. This circumstance leads us to reflect on  a further 
aspect,  which  is  represented  by  the  difficulty  of  judging  the  possibility  of  its 
continuation if the leader that started it changes. In other words, the process of 
cultural renewal is delicate, and may be interrupted, for example if the leader who 
launched it is substituted during the turnaround process. 
 
□ Evidence of the aforementioned problem comes from the case of 
Poste Italiane, the Italian state-owned company which offers postal and 
financial services. In March 1998, a new CEO, Corrado Passera, was 
called to guide a turnaround process. The organization’s situation at 
the  time  was  critical,  given  its  inefficiency,  relevant  losses  and 
transition  from  a  public  body  to  a  state-owned  company.  By  giving 
concreteness  to  managerial  autonomy,  which  is  indeed  difficult  in 
public  corporations  (Cafferata,  1995b),  Passera  designed  a  plan  of 
action  to  turnaround  the  company.  In  extreme  synthesis,  Passera’s 
intent was to focus not only on cost reduction, but also and even more 
on  revenue  growth.  In  order  to  pursue  this  intent,  two  key  issues 
emerged  from  Passera’s  plan.  First,  the  strategic  idea  of  exploiting 
Poste’s  main  strength,  its  widespread  network,  to  offer  financial 
services in competition with banks. This idea generated immediate and 
strong  opposition  by  financial  institutions  (e.g.  Vergnano,  1999a; 
Vergnano, 1999b). Second, the need for cultural renewal, which has 
been  pursued  by  investing  heavily  in  building  a  new  image  and  in 
training hundred of thousands of employees to customer care and pride 
to be a member of Poste. In this context, an important role was played 
by  the  cooperation  with  trade  unions.  The  new  strategy  couldn’t  be 
fruitful without a cultural renewal. 
The  progress  of  the  turnaround  process  is  evidently  reflected  in 
Poste’s  financial  statements  and  the  cultural  renewal  is  clear  to  all 
Italian citizens. In May 2002, though, Passera moved to lead a primary 
Italian bank and a new CEO is now guiding Poste Italiane. It is hard to 
judge  the  impact  of  this  event  on  the  ongoing  process  of  cultural 
renewal at Poste. Will it continue? Will it stop? Will it regress? 
 
The case of Poste Italiane rises a general question: which is the impact of CEO 
succession on an ongoing process of cultural renewal? Our argument then seems to 







This paper has argued that successful  corporate turnarounds depend upon the 
replacement of the current top management and actions to be taken simultaneously 
at three different levels, strategic, financial and organizational. If the company fails 
to establish a new leadership, it is likely that this fact will have a major effect on 
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the  choice  of  the  right  leaders  represents  a  very  difficult  issue.  The  new  top 
management settlement is often followed by the replacement of employees at the 
middle management level. The new actors should effectively integrate  with the 
existing  structure,  so  that  the  whole  firm  will  support  the  process  of  change. 
Actions concerning strategic, financial and organizational issues should then be 
planned, and effectively implemented. In fact, radical change of distressed firms 
seems to require the firm to change as a whole. In other words, it seems to require 
the firm to change in a systemic way. What appears to be an important issue to 
analyse is if systemic change could be implemented before the company’s crisis in 
order to prevent it and avoid the need for turnaround actions.  
Finally,  it  has  been  pointed  out  that  successful  turnarounds  seem  to  imply  a 
renewal of the organization’s shared basic assumptions, i.e. the firm’s culture. To 
this  regard  we  argued  that  firm’s  ideological  change  can  be  expected  to  result 
directly  and  immediately  from  the  establishment  of  a  new  leadership,  whereas 
cultural  renewal  cannot.  The  latter  process  is  a  dialectical  process  which  takes 
place over a long period of time and is aimed at generating an enabling culture. 
Furthermore, this process of cultural renewal should be viewed as a mechanism for 
governing the firm’s fragility. Thus, the most difficult task that the new leaders 
face is not to initiate the turnaround process, but to actually perform it guiding a 
process of cultural renewal which progressively reduces the firm’s fragility. At its 
essence then, a successful process of corporate turnaround can be seen as a process 
of cultural renewal which consists in governing effectively the firm’s fragility, i.e. 
in progressively reducing it. It appears to be crucial that the new leaders don’t 
ignore this process at first, that they don’t neglect to guide it and finally that they 
don’t  fail  it.  Cultural  renewal  appears  to  be  crucial,  as  well  as  complex  and 
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